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REAL PROPERTY-1957 TENNESSEE SURVEY
THOMAS G. ROADY, JR.*

The Rule in Shelley's Case Revisited: During the period covered by
this survey the Supreme Court of Tennessee handed down an opinion'
involving one of those problems periodically recurring in the real
property field. In this decision the court revisited the Rule in Shelley's
Case, pointing out the classic situation to which it applies and calling
2
attention to the statute in Tennessee which abolished the Rule.
The question before the court was in terms of what estate the
grantee, Ralph Parker, acquired where the conveyance was to "Ralph
Parker and at his death to his bodily heirs."3 The court concluded that
this terminology would have called for an application of the Rule in
Shelley's Case at the common law and that, therefore, the Tennessee
statute4 abolishing the Rule was determinative of the question. Under
this statute Ralph Parker's interest is a life estate with a contingent
remainder in fee to those who at his death will answer the description
of the heirs of his body.5
Assuming, as the court did and with apparent justification, that
there is no distinction or legal difference between a conveyance "to
Ralph Parker for life and at his death to his bodily heirs" and a conveyance "to Ralph Parker and at his death to his bodily heirs" as in
the deed under construction, then the court is fully supported by
Tennessee cases and by the authorities in concluding that the Rule in
Shelley's Case would have controlled prior to the statute abolishing
6
the rule in this jurisdiction.
The court had a little difficulty rationalizing the case of Brown v.
Brown,7 decided in 1897. In that case the court had held that the grant* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Faculty Editor, Vanderbilt Law
Review; member, Tennessee and Illinois Bars.
1. Butler v. Parker, 293 S.W.2d 174 (Tenn. 1956).
2. Id. at 177.
3. Id. at 176.
4
4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6 -103 (1956).

5. But the court states that "under the statute all Parker got in the instant
case was a life estate and that his children have a contingent remainder."
293 S.W.2d at 178. This result certainly does not follow from an application
of the statute. As a matter of fact, if the court is construing the words "his
bodily heirs," as used in the conveyance, to mean "his children" then there
is no need to discuss the Rule in Shelley's Case or the entail statute since
neither would have any application. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.43
(Casner ed. 1952); TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 233, 235 (abr. ed. 1940); 3 VAND.

L. REv. 814, 816 (1950).
6. Guy v. Culberson, 164 Tenn. 509, 51 S.W.2d 500 (1932); Polk v. Faris,
17 Tenn. 209 (1836); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.41 (Casner ed. 1952);
1 WALSH, REAL PROPERTY 178 (1947); 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 239-55 (1952);

10 TENN. L. REV. 238 (1932).
7. 43 S.W. 126 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1897).
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ing language in a deed "unto Sallie Brown, and to her bodily heirs
after her decease" created a fee simple estate in Sallie Brown by
virtue of the statute abolishing estates tail in this jurisdiction. The
court recognized the striking similarity between this terminology and
that involved in the case under discussion but concluded that the
holding in the Brown case was based on a "misconception of the rules
of construction with reference to the creation of estates in real prop8
erty."
The Butler case indicates that the Tennessee court is committed to
avoiding a construction calling for an application of the statute abolishing estates tail if this is possible. This is undoubtedly due to the fact
that an application of this statute reduces the hope of issue of the first
taker to the bare expectancy of an heir and results in a situation not
unlike that which existed at the common law with respect to the Rule
in Shelley's Case. Apparently the court feels that an arbitrary application of the statute which turns an estate tail into a fee simple more
often than not frustrates the actual intent of a grantor; and even
though strained constructions may result, we can expect the decisions to follow the tenor of this one, for in this way the limitation
gives an estate for life to the first taker with remainder interests in
others as purchasers. 9 One hopes, however, that Parker does not eventually die survived by grandchildren of a deceased child, for in that
event the words of the court to the effect that Parker's children have
a contingent remainder could cause it some embarrassment.
Boundary Lines: In Montgomery v. Nicelyo the Eastern Section of
the Court of Appeals found that there was sufficient evidence to support a decree below locating, according to a surveyor's report, a disputed boundary line. The suit was originally filed in the circuit court
for damages for timber which plaintiff alleged was wrongfully cut
from his land; but after plaintiff had presented his evidence before
a jury, the circuit judge, on his own motion, decided that matters of
an equitable nature were involved and transferred the case to the
chancery court. The chancellor, on finding that proof was needed concerning the location of a boundary line between land owned by the
respective parties, appointed a surveyor to determine the true location
of the line; the decree affirmed by the court of appeals was based on
the surveyor's report.
There was some dispute and some uncertainty about the direction
and length of defendant's northern boundary line, but the court felt
that the evidence tended to support, and certainly did not preponderate
against, the decree. In reaching this conclusion it was pointed out that
8. 293 S.W.2d at 176.
9. See 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 83-83 (1950); 1
543-48 (1947); 3 VAND.L. REV. 814, 814-17 (1950).
10. 301 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
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"the rule is well settled that a call for a natural or fixed object prevails over calls for courses and distances unless to do so results in
an absurd conclusion and one manifestly not intended."" This rule
appears to be amply supported by the authorities cited in the opinion.
Adverse Possession: An extremely interesting opinion, delivered by
the Middle Section of the Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court, involved the nature of a title acquired by a husband and
wife whose only claim to the property was through adverse possession
of some forty years. 12 The case is noteworthy for at least three reasons: (1) the fact that the common law estate known as "tenancy by
the entireties" is involved; (2) the fact that the holding that the estate acquired by the adverse possession of a husband and wife is a
tenancy in common appears to run counter to the spirit of a number
of cases in this jurisdiction which favor the tenancy by entireties; and
(3) the fact that the court and counsel could find no authority to the
effect that a joint estate could arise out of adverse possession when in
fact such authority appears to exist.
The case originated as an ejectment action brought by the collateral
heirs of the deceased husband against the collateral heirs of the deceased wife. The wife had survived the husband some four years
after the two had lived on the 60-acre farm from 1910 until 1950. In
such a situation one can well appreciate the apparent injustice of a
holding which would favor the collateral heirs of either party. Neither
group has any particular "equities" to be evoked in its behalf and the
question seems to be who is to receive the windfall. In such a situation a tenancy in common reaches a beautifully just result-the collateral heirs of both parties share equally in the property and a partition is decreed.
For one or more of the above reasons this case has received rather
wide comment. 13 Other remarks concerning it are contained elsewhere
in-this survey issue.1 4 While it appears that there is authority which
would have supported a finding of a tenancy by the entireties on the
facts, 15 it is unlikely that many such fact situations will arise. It is
certain that this jurisdiction is now rather firmly committed to the
proposition that a husband and wife acquiring title to realty by adverse
11. Id. at 384.
12. Preston v. Smith. 293 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).

13. See 10 VAND. L. REV. 460 (1957); 16 MD.L.REV. 352 (1956); 55 Mici. L.
3192 (1957): 22 Mo.L.REV. 91 (1957); 24 TENN. L. REV. 892 (1957).
14. Harbison. Domestic Relations-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REV,

REV.

1082, 1093 (1957).

15. 2

TON §

AMERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6 (a) (Casner
REAL PROPERTY 204

180b (1853); 2 TIFFANY,

ed. 1952) ; 2 COKE, LITTLE(3d ed. 1939); 48 C.J.S.,

Joint Tenancy § 3(a) (1947). The court might also have been persunded to
accept the presumption of grant had there been any compelling equities in
favor of a tenancy by the entirety. See Note, Title by Adverse Possession in
Tennessee, 5 VAND. L. REV. 621 (1952).
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possession without color of title hold as tenants in common and not as
tenants by the entirety.
A second case involving a claim of title by adverse possession was
decided by the Middle Section of the Court of Appeals during the
survey period.16 In this case the court found that the evidence in the
hearing below was sufficient to support the injunctive relief granted
plaintiff. Plaintiffs were found to have been in actual possession of
the property, and it was found that defendant had actual knowledge
of this possession. Therefore, defendant was enjoined from committing
trespass and from cutting and removing timber on the land.
The significance of the case is enhanced by the court's discussion of
the four ways in which a party can become the owner of the legal title
to land in Tennessee, viz: "(1) By a connected chain of title deraigned
from either the State of Tennessee or of North Carolina. (2) Deraignment of title to a common source. (3) By seven years adverse possession under a registered assurance of title where the land has been
granted by the State. (4) By twenty years actual adverse possession..."17 This discussion resolves the claim of defendant in its crossbill that it had acquired title to the land by adverse possession. The
evidence did not support defendant's contention.
Eminent Domain, Dedication and Easements: What is the nature of
the interest acquired by a public service company which enters upon
and uses land of another for public purposes for a period of one year,
where the owner thereof fails to institute suit for damages within the
one year period as provided for by statute?18 It has been more or less
generally assumed that by virtue of this Tennessee statute an interest
would arise of a nature equivalent to that resulting from an eminent
domain proceeding under Tennessee Code sections 23-1401 to 23-1422
or from a voluntary conveyance of an interest from the owner to the
public corporation. There was considerable dicta in the court opinions
applying this section of the Code to support this assumption. 19 But
the question had never been directly ruled upon until it was presented
to the Eastern Section of the Court of Appeals in a case during the
survey period. 20 Treating the matter as one of first impression the
court holds that the right acquired by the corporation under section
23-1423 of the Code is nothing more than the right to occupy the land
16. Welch v. A. B. C. Coal Co., 293 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
17. Id. at 48.
18. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1423 (1956).
19. Shinkle v. Nashville Improvement Co., 172 Tenn. 555, 113 S.W.2d 404
(1938); Tennessee Coal, Iron, & Railroad Co. v. Paint Rock, Flume & Transp.
Co., 128 Tenn. 277, 160 S.W. 522 (1913); Smith v. Nashville & Ky. Ry., 88 Tenn.
611, 13 S.W. 128 (1890); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Holt, 3 Tenn. App. 372
(E.S. 1926). See also Trautman, Real Property-956 Tennessee Survey, 9
VAND. L. REV. 1089, 1105-06 (1956).

20. Rogers v. Knoxville, 289 S.W.2d 868 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
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for public use. This view is succinctly stated by the court in the following words:
..an illegal possession cannot ripen into a vested legal right to an easement short of 20 years adverse possession. The failure of the owner to
exercise his right to sue for damages will not be held to confer 21vested rights
upon the expropriator of his property without compensation.

While this decision could not well have even been predicted from
prior decisions, it appears to be a desirable one and one that the writer
believes has caught the spirit of the statutes involved. The terminology, as the court pointed out, falls far short of indicating legislative
intent that a greater interest be acquired under the statute. The result
will certainly discourage any tendency that a public corporation might
have had heretofore to take the property of another without a proceeding of some kind to compensate the owner. The construction
here given Code section 23-1423 will accomplish the desirable objective
of preventing an interruption or interference with land appropriated
for public use but avoid the harsh and rigorous result which flows
from a construction which bars an owner or his successor in interest
forever after the lapse of one year. At the same time the court pointed
out that if the legislature desires that an easement arise after one
year they can say so.2
Other methods of reaching this same result may exist. For example, the court could have described the interest as an easement
in gross but because of the peculiar manner in which it was created
not alienable or assignable. In any event, it is highly pleasing to observe the court striking this blow for the property owner who over the
years has been the victim of encroaching demands being made in the
name of the "public interest."
There is another facet to the case that is somewhat perplexing. Having decided that the interest of the Tennessee Valley Authority, or of
its assignor, was not transferrable but depended on continued public
use of the property, the court then hung the decision on another peg.
It decided that even if an easement was acquired by T.V.A. under
section 23-1423 it had been abandoned in view of the fact that use of
the transmission line was discontinued in 1944 and no further public
use was attempted until after the grant to the city in 1952. Without
laboring this point, the court apparently was distinguishing between
granted or prescriptive easements and easements acquired through
eminent domain. As to the latter type of easement, the court said
there is a presumption of abandonment when the property is not
devoted to a public use for any considerable period of time.
21. Id. at 871.
22. Ibid.
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There is, as the court pointed out in the opinion, authority recognizing that an easement may be extinguished by abandonment In all
such cases, the ultimate fact to be established is the intent to make no
further use of the easement. Such intent might be evidenced by
verbal expression, which alone is not sufficient, or by acts and conduct
of the party claiming the easement. This evidence, in general, takes
the form of cessation of use and conduct inconsistent with the intent
to use the easement further. In this regard one writer stated:
It seems to be well settled that an easement created by a deed of grant,
or otherwise by writing, cannot be proved to have been extinguished by
proof only of nonuser, no matter how long such nonuser may have continued. Where, however, the easement originated in prescription, there
are many dicta, and some decisions, that nonuser for the prescriptive period
establishes a presumption of abandonment, which prevails unless it is
rebutted by contrary evidence. This differentiation does not seem to be a
wise one. An easement established by prescription is just as well established as one originating in the most formal deed. Their methods of extinguishment should be identical.23
It is submitted that to distinguish an easement acquired by eminent
domain from easements acquired in other ways is not realistic; while
the court might well have proceeded on the theory of abandonment of
the easement, it is somewhat confusing to make this distinction.24
In Maxwell v. Lax25 the Western Section of the Court of Appeals
had occasion to consider the right of a dedicator of a public way thereafter to authorize a particular use of property included in the way.
The case turns on the court's finding that the particular use involved
(operation of a sign) constituted a nuisance. Injunctive relief was
granted to an adjoining property owner adversely affected3 6 In this
case the dedication was a formal one "for street purposes as under the
common law." While the dedicator certainly retained many of the
rights of ownership in this instance and might well have been in a
position to authorize some special use of the way, he could not interfere with the easement of the public in any way nor could he maintain
or authorize the existence of a nuisance. The law in this respect is
quite clear.27
A second case involving dedication of an easement of way was
decided by the Western Section of the Court of Appeals during the
survey period.2 8 On this point, the court refused to upset a judgment
in favor of plaintiff since there was evidence in the record to support
23. 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 494-95 (1952).
24. Id. at 495-99. See also RESTATEMENT. PROPERTY § 504, comment d (1944).
25. 292 S.W.2d 223 (Tenn. AMp. W.S. 1954).
26. See Green, Equity-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAmD. L. REv. 1095, 1096
(1957).
27. See 2 WALSH. REAL PROPERTY § 264 (1947).
28. Callahan v. Town of Middleton, 292 S.W.2d 501 (Tenn. App. W.S.' 1954).
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a finding that plaintiff's property had not been dedicated to a public
use. The court also felt that there was evidence to support a finding
that there had not been an adverse use of the property involved for the
prescriptive period.
Highways and streets usually come into existence through one of
the three following methods: (a) dedication, (b) prescription or (c)
condemnation. 29 In this case plaintiff had donated certain property in
front of his place of business to enable the state to widen an existing
street. The dispute arose over the area outside the curb line of the
street which included a grassy area and a newly constructed sidewalk
totaling some twenty feet in width. It was argued by the city that
plaintiff did not own this property because, among other things, he
or his predecessor in title had dedicated it to public use or to the
public. 30 While the evidence might well have supported a contrary
conclusion as to the question of dedication, the court observed that
there was material evidence to support the verdict of the jury and
that its duty was, therefore, to sustain it.31

Landlord and Tenant: Two opinions by Judge Avery of the Western
Section of the Court of Appeals bring into sharp focus what can only
be described as an anomalous situation in the law of this jurisdiction.
The fact situations in the two cases were strikingly similar. In both
cases plaintiffs h--d sustained injuries from falling through openings
designed for fans in attics of houses which they were occupying. In
both cases the openings were not apparent and were concealed by
unsafe coverings. In both cases plaintiffs were seriously injured. In
both cases suit is brought against the owner who had built the houses
on the premises. But in'the first case 2 the court of appeals reversed a
judgment for the owner entered on a directed verdict because of a
determination that the evidence presented a question for the jury,
while in the second case 33 a judgment entered on a directed verdict
for the defendant-owner was affirmed. This result was reached even
though in the first case the plaintiff had occupied the premises for
over fourteen months before sustaining the injuries while in the second
case plaintiff had occupied the premises just over one month, not long
enough to "unpack all the household furnishings, clothes, etc."
To what can we attribute these seemingly diametric results? The
answer is found in the court's conclusion as to the legal relationship
of the parties. Fortunately for the lady in the first case, L. I. Boyce,
she was a tenant of the defendant; and the defendant landlord, under
the Tennessee decisions, has considerable liability in tort for injuries
29. See 2

WALSH, REAL PROPERTY

§ 267 (1957).

30. 292 S.W.2d at 503-04.
31. Id. at 504, 510.
32. Boyce v. Shankman. 292 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. App. W.D. 1953).
33.' McIntosh V. Goodwin, 292 S.W.2d 242 (Tenn. App. W.D. 1954).
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proximately caused by defective condition of the premises.3 4 Unfortunately for the lady in the second case, Mary McIntosh, she was a
purchaser; therefore the defendant vendor owed no duty to disclose
35
to her dangerous conditions of the premises.
While there might well be a basis for questioning the conclusion of
the court in the McIntosh case that the existing relationship between
the parties was vendor and purchaser, one must admit that the court
of appeals had little choice as to the rules to be applied once that
determination was made. Under our system of law it is generally
accepted that inferior courts are not at liberty to flout clearly existing
rules of law.. The doctrine of stare decisis applies with full vigor to
these lesser tribunals. But, without desiring to be presumptuous, it
is suggested that the Supreme Court of this state should review the
justification for a continued application of the caveat emptor principle
to the sale of land and, if it refuses to do so, that the legislature should
act to relieve the incongruous situation now existing. It has been
pointed out previously in these survey articles that some modern real
estate transactions call for different treatment than was accorded a
sale of real estate many years ago.3 It should be noted that, while
Smith v. Tucker did reflect the state of the law in 1921, the language
contained therein, and relied on by the court in the McIntosh decision,
37
is no longer accurate.
Certainty is a very desirable characteristic of law. The measure of
a lawyer's success is in many instances the accuracy with which he can
predict the legal result which flows from a given fact situation. But
the desire for certainty-the need for predictability in the law-the
doctrine of stare decisis-should not blind us to the fact that the common law has traditionally grown, expanded and even changed when
courts have been persuaded that just results were not being achieved
through the application of existing rules and principles. For example,
everyone knows that the greatest stimulus to the development of
equity was the rigidity which resulted from the desire of the early
common law clerks to cram every action into an existing pigeonhole.
34. Pulaski Housing Authority v. Smith, 282 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. App. M.S.
1955); Willcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 538, 46 S.W. 297 (1898); Hines v. Willcox,
96 Tenn. 328, 34 S.W. 420 (1896).
35. See 292 S.W.2d at 249, citing Evans v. Young, 196 Tenn. 118, 126. 264

S.W.2d 577, 580 (1953); Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 362, 270 S.W. 66, 70

(1924).

36. See Trautman and Kirby, Real Property-954 Tennessee Survey, 7
VAND. L. REV. 921, 929 (1954); Trautman, Real Property-1956 Tennessee
Survey, 9 VAND. L. REV. 1089, 1101 (1956).
37. Particular reference is made to the following statement in Smith v.
Tucker which is quoted in the McIntosh case: "[Wihatever may be the
reason, no case can be found in the books where the vendor has been -held
liable in damages to the vendee, or to third persons, for personal injuries
arising from defects in the premises." 292 S.W.2d at 249. See Trautman and
Kirby, Real Property-1954Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND.L. REV. 921, 932 (1954)
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There iCa maxim which many regard as portraying the very spirit of
the common law. It is that cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa, lex.
It is submitted that the reason for blindly applying the caveat emptor
rule to all sales of real estate no longer exists.
In High Point Coal Co. v. East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co.38 the
Supreme Court was required to determine the intention of the parties
with respect to a lease they had executed several years before. The
court decided that the lessee's promise to surrender the demised
premises with all "tramways" in "good working order and condition"
did not entitle the lessor to proceeds from the sale of copper wire
which had been installed by the lessee and used for purposes of supplying power to operate the locomotives in the mine. As there was
nothing in the lease to indicate that the word "tramway" should be
,given other than its ordinary and common meaning, the lessor was
39
not entitled to the wire.
In Sherman v. Southern Advertising Co.40 a purchaser of certain
realty sought a declaratory judgment that a sublease in existence at
the time of his purchase was invalid. There were several reasons why
the purchaser's petition was demurrable; among these the court
pointed out (1) that at time of purchase plaintiff had notice of defendant's (sublessee) equities, (2) that there was no allegation that defendant was in default on any provisions of the lease, (3) that there were
no acts of omission of defendant pertaining to the lease in which
complainant had any rights and (4) that there was no privity of contract or estate between complainant and defendant sublessee.
The basis of petitioner's complaint grew out of the fact that under
the sublease defendant was obligated to repaint and repair certain
buildings on the premises, which buildings the petitioners had torn
down after the purchase. The position of petitioner was that since the
sublessee could not now discharge this duty the consideration had
failed, The court treated this matter as one of impossibility of performance and stated the general rule that nonperformance is excused
if performance is prevented by conduct of the adverse party.41 Certainly on these facts there had been a destruction of an essential specific thing, and the same result would follow from its destruction even
though it had been a fortuitous occurence rather than the result of
an affirmative act of the adverse party.42
Restrictive Covenants: The most effective and well recognized methods of controlling the use of land are restrictive covenants in deeds and
private planning and development that will result in equitable servi296 S.W.2d 845 (Tenn. 1956).
See 3 WMLrsoN, CONt'RACTS §§ 607, 613-14 (rev. ed. 1936).
292 S.W.2d 36 (Tenn. 1956).
Id. at 38.
42. 6 WILMSTON, 'CONTsAOT § 1948 (rev. ed. 1938).
38.
39.
40.
41.

IREAL.
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tudes. The Tennessee Supreme Court hasAad occasion in-4be -past to
rule upon the extent to which such restrictions are enforceable, and
in the truly landmark decision of Ridley, v. Haiman43 the court committed itself to a vigorous enforcement of them. Where the general
plan is apparent from the deeds any of the grantees of a lot in the
tract can enforce the restriction against any .othpr grantee.
During the survey period the Supreme Court again had occasion
to consider the effectiveness of restrictive covenants in controlling the
use of real property and, in its decision in Hackett v. Steele4 4 reaffirmed the position taken in Ridley v. Haiman on the question of
the right of all grantees in a subdivision to enforce the covenants
against all other grantees. In the Hackett case every deed in the
subdivision contained language indicating the intent of the parties to
these deeds that each grantee have the right to enforce the restrictions.
Even without such language the overall plan for limiting the subdivision to residential use was apparent, and it is submitted that intent
could be found from this fact.
The Hackett case is extremely significant because for the first time
the Supreme Court treated directly the question of the right of a
grantee whose property is burdened by one of these restrictive covenants to-have such burden removed when the character of the neighborhood in which his property is located has changed so drastically
that the value of his property when limited to the restricted use is seriously depreciated. In this case, the court affirmed -the decree below
and in effect held that complainant had failed to state a cause of action.
There are a number of jurisdictions where the courts. have held that
landowners burdened by restrictive covenants or equitable servitudes
were no longer under any duty to comply with the restrictions because
it was felt that changes in the character of the surrounding neighborhood made enforcement of the restrictions oppressive and in~quftable. 45
In several of these cases the action of the court has been of such nature
as to terminate completely the restriction, whereas in others. the court
has denied injunctive relief but awarded damages or denied injunctive
relief and left the party to an action at law on the breach of the covenant. It is probably accurate to say that there is a trend in the
American courts toward a recognition of .the fact that conditions can
develop which will justify a court in refusing to enforce these restrictions. While the court in the Hackett case recognized this fact and
indicated that it might in some instances grant relief, the decision
appears to have the net effect of being quite vigorous in its support of
this method of restricting land use.
43. 297 Tenn.47 S.W.2d
750 (1932).
-44. 164
SW.2d23.),
63 ,(Tenn.
1956)..
45. 2 AmEiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.39 (Casner ed. 1952); See Annots.,

4 A.L.R.2d 1111 (1949), 88 A.L.R. 405 (1934).....
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Assuming that relief from the burden of such restrictions is available, the important question is just what must the landowner allege and
prove to be entitled to it. Some of the decisions have stated that the
change in the character of the surrounding neighborhood must be such
as "to make it impossible any longer to secure in a substantial degree
the benefits sought to be realized through the performance of the
building restriction."46 Other courts have stated that the change must
be such as to render the restriction "valueless to the owner of the
benefited land and oppressive or unreasonable as to the owner of the
burdened land. ' 47 In the Hackett case the Tennessee court said that
the change alleged and proved must be such "that the purposes of the
restrictive covenants relating to the entire subdivision have become
burdensome and are not being maintained for the benefit of the
owners of the lots. '48 It would seem that such a situation will rarely
occur and that for practical purposes there is little likelihood that a
burdened owner in this jurisdiction will receive relief if the court
stands fast on this test. Even though the cases where restrictive
covenants are detrimental and increasingly burdensome to property
owners on the outlying edges of restricted areas have and will continue to become more numerous, much can be said in support of the
view expressed by the Supreme Court in the Hackett case. It prevents
a piecemeal erosion of a planned area leading to its eventual defeat.
The restrictions are treated as enforceable as against all of the land
embraced by them or against none of it.
This view carries out the plan of the subdivider, which provided a
greater protection to the interior lots than to the border ones. This difference of protection determined the purchase price paid in the original
sales by the common grantor. To permit the border lot owners to later
renege on their bargain to the detriment of the interior lot owners is to
give them an economic advantage that they did not pay for. 49

Miscellaneous: In Butler v. Holland O the Supreme Court observes
that registration of a deed is notice to all the world of the conveyance
it purports to represent and that such conveyance cannot, therefore,
be attacked as fraudulent by creditors who contract debts with the
grantor subsequent to such registration. 51
In Lowe v. Wright52 the Middle Section of the Court of Appeals re46. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.39 (Casner ed. 1952).
47. Ibid.

48. 297 S.W.2d at 68.
49. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.39 (Casner ed. 1952).
50. 289 S.W.2d 701 (Tenn. 1956).

51. See Long v. True, 149 Tenn. 673, 261 S.W. 673 (1924); Nelson v. Vanden,

99 Tenn. 224, 42 S.W. 5 (1897). The reason for this result is that under
such circumstances (knowledge or notice of creditor, actual or imputed) the
creditor cannot be regarded as "hindered, delayed or defrauded" by such
transfer.
52. 292 S.W.2d 413 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
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states a proposition apparently well established in Tennessee that,
while the Statute of Frauds requires an agent's authority to execute
a deed to be by deed or by writing of equal formality with a deed, the
authority of an agent to contract to sell land in the name of the principal need not be in writing. In this case the agent had forged a deed
as part of a scheme to defraud both his principal and the purchaser.
Ordinarily a forged deed would be absolutely void, and it appears that
the court did not dispute this proposition. But the evidence led the
court to conclude that the agent did have authority to contract for the
sale of the property involved although such authority was not in writing and that while the purchaser did not acquire any interest in the
real estate by virtue of the forged deed, he did acquire an equitable
interest by virtue of the contract for sale entered into with the owner's
agent. The complainant owner cannot clear his title without restoring
to the purchaser the money collected by his agent under the valid
53
contract.
This case should also be required reading for all notaries and other
officers who take acknowledgments to deeds. All too often notaries,
intending to lessen inconvenience to parties and acting under the
illusion that they are befriending an attorney or real estate broker,
find too late that they have been imposed upon. This case shows the
risk that a notary runs in not requiring all acknowledgments to be
made in his presence and in not taking precautions to determine that
those making acknowledgments are who they purport to be.
54
The Eastern Section of the Court of Appeals in Nicely v. Nicely
discussed the right of tenants in common to a partition of real estate
held by them. In this case there were seven cotenants. One had an
undivided one-half interest in the real estate and the rest were entitled
to one-twelfth each. The chancellor had overruled the master's report
and judgment that the facts called for a sale for partition rather than
a partition in kind and had directed a partition in kind which resulted
in the eventual division of the tract into two parcels, one of which
tracts the appellants elected to take, under protest, as tenants in
common in fee simple. The court of appeals reversed the chancellor
for the reason that under the statute the court has no power to allot a
certain tract of land to a group "to be held as tenants in common by
them without their consent"5 5 and for the further reason that the
weight of proof overwhelmingly supported the master's finding that
the tract was not susceptible to partition in kind. The case presents a
clear and concise interpretation of the code sections involved.

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 419.
293 SW.2d 30 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
Id. at 32-33.
TENN. ConE ANN. §§ 23-2101 to -2104 (1956).
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In Stratton v. Conway5 7 the Supreme. Court affirmed a judgment
sustaining a demurrer to the declaration of a landowner in Shelby
County who was suing an adjoining landowner and a real estate
broker to recover damages for sale of realty to Negroes in an exclusively white neighborhood. The case presented the somewhat novel
proposition that, even conceding the legal right of an owner to sell
his property to Negroes if he desired to do so, a sale by a landowner
that results in the depreciation in value of surrounding property is
actionable and such owner is liable in damages to his neighbor for
such damage. The court, amply supported by authorities, concluded
that this is a case of damage without injury.
In Allen v. Goldstein 58 the court of appeals affirmed the decree of
the chancellor refusing to set aside the foreclosure of a trust deed.
Extensive quotations from the record support the conclusion of the
court that the evidence was not sufficiently clear and convincing to
justify the action sought.
Harrisv. Dobson-Tankard Co.59 gave the court of appeals an opportunity to restate several well-established propositions of law. The first
of these is that a purchaser at a foreclosure sale of mortgaged property
is charged with notice of the claims of those in active physical possession of the property at the time of the sale. 60 The second proposition
is that a tenant holding under an oral lease from month to month is
entitled to notice to quit and that without such notice the tenant's
holding is not unlawful.6 1 The third proposition is that an eviction
of a tenant without first giving the five days notice to which he is entitled by virtue of the relationship is actionable.62
Evans v. Young 63 presented a perplexing and difficult problem to the
Supreme Court of Tennessee. The court was called upon to determine
whether collateral heirs of a Negro born of slave parents would inherit
real property left by him upon his death or whether such property
would go to his widow under the provisions of Code section 31-103.
The question was complicated by the fact that prior decisions construing applicable statutes had been to the effect that the right of
inheritance extended only to legitimate children of former slave parents and not to collateral kin. The court in a lengthy opinion held in
favor of the collateral heirs emphasizing the fact that the legislature
had, subsequent to their prior interpretation of Code section 31-102,64
enacted section 31-303, which they felt indicated an intent to extend
57. 301 S.W.2d 332 (Tenn. 1957).

58. 291 S.W.2d 596 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

298 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Ibid.
299 S.W.2d 218 (Tenn. 1957).

64. TENN.CODE ANN.§ 31-302 (1956).
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the right of inheritance .to collateral kindred of a deceased Negro.
There was a vigorous dissent by Justice Swepston whose opinion was
to the effect that, the court had reached "an absurd result never intended by our Legislature." 65
Legislation: In 1955 the Tennessee Supreme Court in the case of
First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Dearth66 held that a purchaser for
value from an heir of a decedent runs the risk that subsequent to the
purchase a will may be found and probated wherein decedent devised
the real estate to someone other than the purchaser's grantor. In the
FirstFederal case the devisee of the unrecorded, subsequently found,
will prevailed over the purchaser for value from the heir. The significance of this decision was pointed up in excellent fashion by the writer
of the survey article appearing in the Vanderbilt Law Review last
year.67 In this article Professor Trautman suggested that legislation
might well be in order designed to protect a bona fide purchaser for
value when he (1) purchases from the heir as against an unprobated
wiU, (2) purchases from a devisee named in a probated will as against
heir who later successfully contests the will and (3) purchases from
the devisee of a probated will as against the devisee named in a will
later admitted to probate.
There is no question but that such legislation would tend to stimulate commercial transactions of real estate, for lending institutions in
particular are now most sensitive to the risk they run in lending to an
heir of an apparent intestate or to a devisee shortly after his testator's
death. The Eightieth General Assembly was conscious of the problem
involved, for during its sessions an amendment to section 30-610 of
the Tennessee Code was enacted. 68 This amendment tends to eliminate
some, although not all, of these risks heretofore run by the purchaser
for value from an heir or devisee of real estate and in addition tends
to clarify the position of a creditor of a decedent with respect to real
estate which decedent owned at the time of his death.
Section 1 (1) of the act provides that a mortgagee or purchaser for
value from the heir or devisee of a decedent takes subject to the right
of any unsatisfied creditor of decedent to subject the realty to payment
of his claim for a period of one year. In the event an administration
on the decedent's estate is granted within one year of decedent's death,
then claims of creditors ultimately established as valid obligations of
the estate in such administration shall constitute a lien on realty of
decedent in the hands of an heir or his alienees.
Section 1 (2) of the act provides that a mortgagee or purchaser for
65. 299 S.W.2d at 228.
66. 279 S.W.2d 503 (Tenn. 1955).
67. Trautman, Real Property-1956 Tennessee Survey, 9
1089, 1089-92 (1956).
68. Tenn. Pulb. Acts 1957, c. 118, § 1.
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value from the heir of a decedent shall take title free from the right of
non-lien creditors to proceed against such property where one year has
elapsed without an administration and the mortgagee or purchaser
takes without actual knowledge of the debt.
Section 1 (3) provides that after one year from the date of decedent's
death a mortgagee or purchaser for value from the heir of a decedent
shall take free from the title, right or claims arising out of an unprobated will unless such mortgagee or purchaser has actual knowledge of
the existence of the unprobated will.
There was other legislation of less general concern about which no
comment is made in this article.69
69. See Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 19, § 3, TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-2001 (Supp.
1957) (statute creating a Division of Water Resources in the Department of
Conservation aimed at facilitating and developing basic water resources
policies for the state); Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 194, § 1, TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 49-113 (Supp. 1957) (statute authorizing leasing of public lands under
jurisdiction of Department of Education to fraternities and sororities); Tenn.
Pub. Acts 1957, c. 298, § 1, TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1526 (Supp. 1957) (statute
authorizing state, counties and municipalities to pay into court money in
condemnation cases to stop running of interest and authorizing owner of
condemned property to withdraw such money without prejudice to his rights).

